MB Civil Trial: JK/KK Contempt of Court?

I just feel extremely sorry for all the lawyers and their staff members who will have to slog through all those social media posts. And all the trees that will have to die in order to print them out for the giant stacks of paper someone will have to drag into the court room.

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Good link, thank you!

The link points out that you get paid per ad viewed not per video, which makes it harder to guess as a viewer. Also that ad rates vary a lot across content areas. So it’s not so clear that you need a million viewers on one post to make a decent income.

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IANAL either, but this is what the court decided in State v. Fields:

“We hold that NGI committees possess the same right to automatic periodic review of the justification for their commitment (or lesser restraints, as the case may be) as that enjoyed by civil committees. We further hold that the State must bear the ultimate burden of proof in justifying any continued restrictions upon the liberty of NGI committees at each periodic review proceeding by establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such restrictions currently meet the criteria set forth in Krol for the initial imposition of restraints.”

It seems to uphold the concept that NGRI are to be treated the same as any other civil committee which I think supports the concept that a lack of review or failure to release where a civil committee would be punitive.

Ms. Fields appears to have a very different diagnosis from MB so comparison of her situation and MBs doesn’t seem to be applicable.

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Something tells me he’s used to push back and nasty comments and probably threats of law suits from fathers and daughters! The problem for them is everything he said is true!!

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I know one thing for sure: After watching Dr. Grande, MBs people may want to resurrect that civil case against the police department.

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Is it possible that it was temporarily disabled because LK complained and now it is back up because YT cleared it?

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No idea. I saw it 2x 30 minutes apart and it was there both times.

It’s been there every time I’ve looked.

I agree that it says they must be treated the same. However, the determination is “dangerousness” by a judge, not specific diagnosis of what type of mental disorder. Please see excerpts below.

Excerpts State vs Fields 1978

Working through the levels

“If at any periodic review proceeding the State is unable to meet its burden of justifying the continuance of the currently prevailing restraints upon the liberty of the committee, it becomes the task of the reviewing judge again to “mold” an appropriate order based upon his evaluation of the level of restraints dictated by the committee’s present condition. Krol’s guidelines, quoted above, for the formulation of the initial order remain applicable. The mere failure of the State to prove the necessity of continuing the prevailing restraints does not entitle the committee to relaxation of those restraints to any extent he might desire. The new order should provide for the least restrictive restraints which *303 are found by the judge to be consistent with the well-being of the community and the individual. The determination of the suitable level of restraint is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the reviewing judge based on his firsthand evaluation of the particular case and is one as to which he must be accorded a wide range of flexibility. However, even where the committee’s condition shows marked improvement, only the most extraordinary case would justify modification in any manner other than by a gradual deescalation of the restraints upon the committee’s liberty. For example, where the State is unable to justify the continuance of an order for restrictive confinement, the outright release of the committee into the community without the use of any intermediate levels of restraint, see State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 403-404 (1974), would normally constitute a manifestly mistaken exercise of the reviewing court’s discretion.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the relaxation of the restraints on the committee’s liberty must proceed in gradual stages. As the level of dangerousness posed by the committeee decreases, he should be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate his ability to cope responsibly with the stresses of normal everyday life with diminishing degrees of supervision. Only after the committee has progressed to the point where he has proven that he can function in normal society with minimal supervision should consideration be given to unconditional release. This process of gradual deescalation will substantially minimize the risk of erroneous determinations of non-dangerousness and will thus protect the State’s compelling interest in maintaining the safety and security of its citizens.“

Dangerousness

“ The standard is “dangerous to self or society.” Dangerous conduct is not identical with criminal conduct. Dangerous conduct involves not merely violation of social norms enforced by criminal sanctions, but significant physical or psychological injury to persons or substantial destruction of property. Persons are not to be indefinitely incarcerated because they present a risk of future conduct which is merely socially undesirable. Personal liberty and autonomy are of too great value to be sacrificed to protect society against the possibility of future behavior which some may find odd, *307 disagreeable, or offensive, or even against the possibility of future non-dangerous acts which would be ground for criminal prosecution if actually committed. Unlike inanimate objects, people cannot be suppressed simply because they may become public nuisances.

Commitment requires that there be a substantial risk of dangerous conduct within the reasonably foreseeable future. Evaluation of the magnitude of the risk involves consideration both of the likelihood of dangerous conduct and the seriousness of the harm which may ensue if such conduct takes place. It is not sufficient that the state establish a possibility that defendant might commit some dangerous acts at some time in the indefinite future. The risk of danger, a product of the likelihood of such conduct and the degree of harm which may ensue, must be substantial within the reasonably foreseeable future. On the other hand, certainty of prediction is not required and cannot reasonably be expected.

A defendant may be dangerous in only certain types of situations or in connection with relationships with certain individuals. An evaluation of dangerousness in such cases must take into account the likelihood that defendant will be exposed to such situations or come into contact with such individuals.

Determination of dangerousness involves prediction of defendant’s future conduct rather than mere characterization of his past conduct. Nonetheless, defendant’s past conduct is important evidence as to his probable future conduct. It is appropriate for the court to give substantial weight to the nature and seriousness of the crime committed by defendant and its relationship to his present mental condition.

It should be emphasized that while courts in determining dangerousness should take full advantage of expert testimony presented by the State and by defendant, the decision is not one that can be left wholly to the technical expertise of the psychiatrists and psychologists. The determination of dangerousness involves a delicate balancing of society’s interest in protection from harmful conduct against the individual’s interest in personal liberty and autonomy. This decision, while requiring the court to make use of the assistance which medical testimony may provide, is ultimately a legal one, not a medical one.”

Differences for those who have actually committed an act that would otherwise be a crime

“ In addition to justifying temporary observational confinement of a prospective NGI committee, see State v. Krol, 68 N.J. at 256, the fact that he has actually engaged in dangerous conduct otherwise criminal should weigh heavily in the court’s assessment of the need for the continued imposition of restraints upon his liberty. See State v. Krol, 68 N.J. at 261 and n. 12. Although his commission of an offense is, like any other instance of demonstrated dangerous behavior, of only evidentiary significance in the judge’s determination of his dangerousness, evidence pertaining to that offense is highly probative of the ultimate issue. This is so because the actual commission of an act which violates the rules governing conduct in the community is of a different order of magnitude than mere threats to engage in such conduct. It is also more telling than is the commission of antisocial acts of lesser gravity. In short, an NGI committee’s prior commission of an act for which he has been relieved of criminal responsibility is powerful evidence of his potential dangerousness and should be weighed accordingly in making that legal judgment.”

Ah. The civil case against law enforcement shown to be without grounds and an example of dienenger’s not so well written filings. Everyone has a bad day sometimes.

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Yeah, Nagel is proof of that.

The original suit regarded violation of Michael’s rights. Unless there is a statute of limitations I would hope there are other reasons to refile, particularly after the criminal verdict.

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Also, LK had the means to walk away. She wasn’t trapped.

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Lauren Kanarek lies! Lauren Kanarek has admitted under oath that she lies.

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Ok…I guess it was an error on my end then.

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Good. Then it shouldn’t bother you too much if they refile.

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I still have an AOL address. Two, actually. I have several others, too, but it’s handy to keep the old one for times when old contacts may try to reach me. And the second AOL one is what I use for all my online shopping, newsletter signups, etc.so it’s where most of the spam goes.

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I do also

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Good to know!

Do you think that’s a good use of the GFM funds?

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Have you looked at his “credentials in mental health”?